Resolution 1540
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ACRONYMS

AG = Australia Group
BTWC = Biological Toxin Weapons Convention
CTBT = Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CNS = Convention on Nuclear Safety
CPPNM = Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
CWC = Chemical Weapons Convention
GWe = Gigawatt Electric
EU = European Union
IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency
AP = Additional Protocol in force
CSA = Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force
JC = Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
MTCR = Missile Technology Control Regime
MW = Megawatt
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC = Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCBW = Nuclear Chemical Biological Weapons
NSG = Nuclear Suppliers Group
NPT = Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTC = International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
NWFZ = African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty)
OPCW = Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
TFC = International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
UNIDIR = United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNSCR 1540 = United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
WA = Wassenaar Arrangement
WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZC = Zangger Committee


United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Database

Overview Regions Assistance Membership Resources

Overview

Updated June 2009

Introduction

In the last several years, the threat that non-state actors may acquire nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons has become an increasing concern for the international community. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and other countries have sought ways to address growing concerns about non-state actors' acquiring and distributing NBC weapons. Information gathered in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks about the ambitions of terrorists and terrorist organizations to acquire and use NBC weapons increased this concern. Revelations about the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology by a global network headed by Pakistan's Dr. A.Q. Khan pointed to the shortcomings of existing nonproliferation treaties.

Responding to these concerns, in April 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery. The resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is legally binding on all UN members.

The resolution requires states to implement domestic legislation to prevent non-state actors from manufacturing, acquiring, or transporting NBC weapons within or from their territory. A Committee was established under the Security Council to monitor implementation of these national legal measures, and states have been required to submit a report on their implementation efforts to this Committee.

UNSCR 1540 represents a new facet of the NBC weapons nonproliferation regime and a new role for the Security Council in proliferation prevention. This approach has significant potential to alleviate some of the most pressing proliferation concerns. However, the resolution requires complex implementation measures and mechanisms that raise questions regarding the prospect of universal state adherence to its varied obligations.

This database, prepared by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), is designed to provide a host of both regional and national information relevant to UNSCR 1540 in a single source. The database is anchored to an interactive world map divided into 8 geographical regions:

In addition to an overview of 1540 implementation and related activities in each region, other information provided per region includes:

Although all the resolution's provisions are binding on all states, the roles that states may play in the proliferation of NBC weapons are very different. Some states have the potential to serve as a source of NBC weapons or the materials to manufacture them. Others may provide a transit route for such materials or technologies or a haven where the financing of such activities may be conducted without scrutiny. Moreover, the varied nonproliferation challenges faced by states in each region and their varied capacities to deal with these challenges have a significant impact on efforts to implement UNSCR 1540. Therefore, certain security issues facing many of the states in each region are identified to provide some indication of the aspects of the resolution that may be an implementation priority.

As the 1540 Committee is restricted in the use of information not directly related to the scope of the resolution, this database also provides information that may have a bearing on the implementation of the resolution in various countries and regions. This additional information includes a brief description of national capabilities related to current or prior possession of NBC weapons or industries and facilities that may contribute to their production or proliferation; illicit trafficking activities, including those related to highly enriched uranium and plutonium; and incidents of terrorism or/and presence of terrorist groups.

Since measures to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related materials and technologies can only be as effective as the capability and willingness of the relevant national authorities to enforce them, a significant factor limiting the effectiveness of such measures is the degree of corruption (indicative of the likelihood that authorities may either ignore or actively contribute to proliferation even when nonproliferation laws are in place) as measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Thus each country summary includes its Corruption Perceptions ranking.

Background

To strengthen nonproliferation measures, President George W. Bush first announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003. The PSI is an initiative to coordinate efforts to impede sea, air, and land shipments of NBC weapons, delivery systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors. The PSI is an unofficial and informal partnership of countries; the core group numbers about 16 states. With no legal grounding, the initiative is an "activity not an organization"; there are no plans to evolve PSI into a formal international organization with a headquarters, an international secretariat, formal rules of procedure, or its own budget.

Primarily to counter non-state actor proliferation and secondarily to provide support for the PSI, Britain, the United States, and other countries urged the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1540. While the PSI and Resolution 1540 are complementary in that they both bring together countries in partnership to fight against NBC weapons trafficking, many countries, including China, made it clear that Resolution 1540 by no means endorses the PSI or the type of activities associated with it.

One of the weaknesses of the existing nonproliferation regime is that it does not sufficiently cover the means of delivery of NBC weapons and related materials nor does it adequately address activities by private entities. The goal of Resolution 1540 is to contribute to the international control of NBC weapons and related goods. However, given the many uncertainties about the definitions of terms in the resolution and about its implementation, it is questionable how effective the resolution will be.

Process of Adoption

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. By taking the extraordinary step of adopting the resolution under Chapter VII, the UN Security Council highlighted the growing threat to international security posed by NBC weapons proliferation. The Charter of the United Nations provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security; the Security Council has primary responsibility for this function. Chapter VII addresses "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." Other Chapter VII resolutions have dealt specifically with Iraq, Afghanistan, other conflict zones, and the attacks of 9/11. Article 39 of Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority to determine when a threat to international peace and security exists and to decide what counteractive measures shall be taken, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Decisions adopted under Chapter VII are binding upon all member states and override other international obligations. The UN Security Council underscored the importance of preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons by adopting Resolution 1540 pursuant to Chapter VII.

The resolution took many months to pass through the different stages of negotiation before its adoption in April 2004. There were early versions of the draft that were discussed among permanent member nations of the Security Council. While the original draft included direct reference to the PSI, this reference was replaced at the insistence of China with a call on all states to cooperate. Council members and more than 20 non-members were allowed to comment on this draft at the open Council meeting held on April 22. However, none of the proposals put forth by non-Security Council members was taken into consideration when the final text was drafted. After the comments made during this open session, a few changes were made to the draft before the Council voted on it, during a closed-door session of Security Council members on April 28.

The unanimous adoption of the resolution prompted varying reactions from member states. Many reacted to the "legislative" nature of the resolution: it binds all member states but was adopted by a Council that consists of only 15 members. For example, India's representative stated: "We are concerned that the exercise of legislative functions by the Council, combined with recourse to Chapter VII mandates, could disrupt the balance of power between the General Assembly and the Security Council, as enshrined in the Charter." However Spain's representative noted that the resolution is a "part of the fight against terrorism and a continuation of what began with resolution 1373 (2001), which was adopted with the framework of Chapter VII. It would therefore be hard to understand why one would not apply Chapter VII on this occasion." These divergent comments reflect the fact that this is only the second time since 1945 that the Council has taken a sweeping, general decision by invoking Chapter VII powers. The first resolution of this kind, Resolution 1373 addressing threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, was adopted in response to the September 11 attacks and contains similar provisions placing general obligations on states.

Resolution 1540 recognizes "the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this... threat to international security." The resolution requires all states to:

  • "Adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes" (paragraph 2);
  • "Take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials." To enact controls that include: (a) measures to account for and secure such items; (b) effective physical protection measures; (c) effective border controls and law enforcement efforts; and (d) effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items (paragraph 3).

The resolution further calls upon states to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation (paragraph 9) and to take cooperative action to prevent illegal trafficking (paragraph 10).

Another provision of Resolution 1540 establishes a Committee of the Security Council. The Committee is comprised of representatives from each member of the Security Council along with any additional outside experts tasked by the United Nations to aid the Committee in its work. The mandate for the Committee originally was set to expire on April 28, 2006, but was extended twice until April 2011. The Committee's main objective is to collect comprehensive reports from states parties; the first report was due six months from the adoption of the resolution on October 28, 2004. By the deadline, 54 countries had submitted their required reports.

Within the report, a member country provides details on the steps that have been taken or the intended steps towards the implementation of this resolution. For example, France submitted a 25-page report detailing the nonproliferation efforts for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. It also provided information on France's membership in export control regimes or other multilateral forums. Furthermore, the comprehensive report outlined inter-ministerial coordination and other measures taken by France to implement Resolution 1540. The United States submitted a report that provides a survey of the range of U.S. laws, programs, and initiatives to address proliferation. The report, a multi-agency effort, provides detailed information on U.S. efforts to implement the resolution. It also includes U.S. assistance to other states, support for the existing nonproliferation treaties, and efforts to prevent NBC weapons trafficking. In contrast, countries such as Burkina Faso submitted a 2-page report indicating that the country is neither an exporter nor producer of such weapons, and with little information to provide, it simply stated its support for the resolution. The country reports serve as an important tool in understanding the scope of the proliferation challenge and how it can best be addressed. Furthermore, the Committee's purpose in conducting the reviews of these reports is to identify where governments have overlooked proliferation loopholes in their national statues, border controls, and export control systems.

The Committee analyzed the country reports and prepared a report to the Security Council in April 2006 on member states' progress towards enacting laws and procedures to enforce them. At that time, 129 states had submitted their first national report, but 62 states had not. The report contained detailed recommendations to help the Security Council monitor the implementation of the resolution and to allow states to fulfill its requirements. As part of the implementation effort, the Committee developed a legislative database containing information on national legislation adopted by states to comply with Resolution 1540.

An April 25, 2008 UN Security Council Resolution extended the Committee's mandate until April 2011, and called on states to help the committee implement the resolution's requirements. As of May 2009, the 1540 Committee website lists 148 states that have submitted their natinoal implementation reports.

Issues Raised by UNSCR 1540

The adoption of Resolution 1540 raises several issues and poses ongoing challenges for the international community. The first and foremost question involves the Security Council's authority. The Council, in unanimously adopting the resolution has imposed obligations on states that neither negotiated nor ratified the process and now have no choice but to comply. There is also the question of whether a UN resolution should address an issue that has traditionally been covered by the three main treaties of the nonproliferation regime. However, these treaties do not directly regulate non-state actor behavior and the requirements outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) leave substantial gaps, especially given the less than universal adherence to these NBC weapons-related treaties. There are signs that the resolution will complement rather than conflict with the existing treaties. For example, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, provided a briefing to the 1540 Committee in which he emphasized that improvements in measures to implement the CWC are occurring in parallel with the complementary requirements laid down in Resolution 1540, which are binding on all UN member states, including states that are not members of the OPCW.

Another issue that has been raised is whether the Security Council will back up the resolution with enforcement measures to hold states accountable for their compliance, and whether states fully appreciate the implications of the obligations that have been placed upon them. Furthermore, states must meet the resolution's legally binding requirement to institute "appropriate" and "effective" measures to deny non-state actors NBC weapons. However, the resolution does not define what is "appropriate" or "effective," leaving this task to the Committee to interpret these standards. Another issue that has come to light is that many states, for example Burkina Faso, Peru, the Republic of Namibia, Oman and others contend that the resolution does not apply to them because they lack the weapons or materials targeted by the resolution. Additionally, others maintain that they do not have the capacity or the resources to execute the mandate of the resolution. The burden of responsibility then falls on the richer nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Australia Group to develop and implement the necessary legal structures and enforcement measures. This brings to light concerns about lack of enforcement and what becomes of non-compliant states when "non-compliance" has not been clearly defined. A final issue is the effective implementation of Resolution 1540 and the responsibility of international organizations and states with the capacity to satisfy the terms of the resolution to help those 150 nations without the adequate legal infrastructure to successfully do the same.

While Resolution 1540 shows the resolve of some states to stop the proliferation of NBC weapons to non-state actors, its provisions will require much cooperation by states in order to be effective. This database aims to provide a host of both regional and national information relevant for Resolution 1540 in a single source. As such it is designed to assist states in implementing the resolution.

View the database credits page.

CNS This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

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