By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — A global financial meltdown might be at the top of U.S. President-elect Barack Obama’s agenda upon taking office Jan. 20, but international diplomats are already abuzz about the prospects for strengthening nuclear nonproliferation regimes under the new administration (see GSN, Oct. 20). The Obama administration should have an early opportunity to signal its approach to the matter during a May 2009 preparatory meeting for the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference, according to experts. The preparatory committee meeting in New York is expected to set the stage for the full review conference, a weeks-long summit held every five years to assess the performance of the treaty and to discuss ways of improving the pact. Participants in the process are beginning to call for new initiatives ranging from taking major nuclear arsenals off hair-trigger alert to ensuring that any new global agreements apply to atomic arms in Pakistan, India and Israel (see GSN, Oct. 24 and Oct. 21). As a presidential candidate, the Illinois Democrat stated an interest in bolstering the nonproliferation accord. However, he has yet to flesh out the details of such an effort. “When I'm president, we'll strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty so that nations that don't comply will automatically face strong international sanctions,” Obama said last year. He also pledged to "take the lead to work for a world in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be reduced and ultimately eliminated." Under the treaty, signatory nations with nuclear weapons — the United States and four other major powers — have vowed “good faith” efforts to work toward disarmament in exchange for all other nations renouncing nuclear arsenals. The pact allows international assistance for civilian nuclear energy programs, as long as nations can demonstrate that atomic materials or technology are not diverted to military efforts. However, the treaty’s effectiveness has increasingly come under question in recent years, with North Korea and allegedly Iran developing nuclear weapons in secret (see GSN, Sept. 30). Questions swirl over the possibility that Syria is doing the same (see GSN, Nov. 11). Some arms control advocates have charged that a new U.S. nuclear trade deal with India has further weakened the NPT rules by legitimizing the nonsignatory nation’s atomic arms, thereby setting an international double standard (see GSN, Oct. 22). Obama opted to support the India accord — negotiated and championed by President George W. Bush — so long as the pact would not aid the South Asian nation’s ability to build new weapons or export its technology to other countries. “The existing agreement effectively balanced a range of important issues — from our strategic relationship with India to our nonproliferation concerns to India's energy need,” Obama said in July. “I am therefore reluctant to seek changes." Given the nuances surrounding nonproliferation issues, it might be unrealistic to expect the incoming administration to be ready to hash out its policy approach to the 2010 NPT Review Conference by the May 4-15 preparatory committee session, according to one observer. “A new administration takes office in January 2009, making [the May 2009] PrepCom too early for [a] major reorientation of U.S. policies,” Deepti Choubey, deputy director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said during a Nov. 7 panel discussion. There she presented a new monograph titled, “Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?” “I’m a little worried about the expectations that the rest of the world has of an Obama administration,” she said. “We need to tamp down those expectations … because this administration is facing a very crowded policy agenda. And there are significant bureaucratic challenges for coordinating a reorientation in approach … [in] a very short time frame for action.” Another panelist, though, argued that high expectations could become a catalyst in helping the new administration reach challenging objectives — in this case, preserving and bolstering crucial nonproliferation norms. “Don’t try to tamp down expectations,” cautioned Achilles Zaluar, a Brazilian diplomat who specializes in nonproliferation and defense issues. “Expectations … are to the national regimes as credit is to banks and to the financial system. They are … the blood that makes it live.” Rather, he said, participants in the upcoming review process must “restore some sense of shared assumptions and shared expectations.” Another panelist, Australian envoy Peter Sawczak, said it might prove difficult to rally global interest in the issue amid protracted economic crises and military conflicts. “I don’t know how we capture public attention with this,” he said. “We’ve obviously done it very successfully in the context of landmines and cluster weapons, but we can’t really afford a humanitarian disaster in the nuclear context to move public debate along.” Another challenge would be “to present nuclear challenges in layman’s terms,” said Sawczak, a former counterproliferation official at the Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade Department. The scientific community must find a way “to explain how we can achieve disarmament, intervening stockpile security, and increased nuclear energy quickly,” he said. A U.S. diplomat in the audience raised the notion that reaching for an ideal outcome in 2010 might set up the conference for failure, potentially poisoning the atmosphere for small but positive steps that might otherwise be achieved. “It’s good to have high expectations because that helps you reach them,” said Scott Davis of the State Department. “But … we know we did not reach [consensus at an NPT review] in 2005; we know there’s great contention among the parties on a range of issues; and I will suggest that it will be very difficult to get consensus on at least a comprehensive set of NPT issues at the 2010 conference.” Another U.S. official — Mike Wheeler of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency — raised similar concerns. He cited the ongoing financial crisis that could result in “the energy [being] sucked out at the senior level of almost every government.” “What can you do to manage expectations that the 2010 conference really is a step on the way to 2015, as opposed to a make-or-break conference, which is some of the ways that the expectations have been posed here?” Wheeler asked from the audience. Others, though, said it is not a stretch to imagine the new administration diving into the issue immediately, setting forth its goals at the May preparatory conference and leading the globe to significant progress at the review conference in 2010. “We have a president-elect who’s got views that are substantially different from the previous president on many nonproliferation [and] disarmament issues,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. “I think it is not just possible but it’s absolutely necessary that the PrepCom recognize that the 2010 review conference review the progress or lack of progress on the commitments made in 2005 and 2000.” Treaty nations in 2000 agreed on a set of 13 “practical steps” to move toward the treaty’s disarmament provisions, including ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and negotiation of a “START III” accord for additional nuclear arms reductions. However, the Bush administration opposed test ban ratification and it achieved a more informal arms reduction agreement, the Moscow Treaty, in 2002. The 2005 session resulted in deadlock (see GSN, May 27, 2005). A new U.S. election this year has introduced the potential for significant change, Zaluar noted. “You have a change of policy here,” he said. “You have everybody trying to make good with a new administration, including the other nuclear-armed states. You have good relations between the U.S. and India. I think you have a positive climate [for] diplomacy in general. … [It is] much more positive than we had, let’s say, just after the invasion of Iraq and I think that [mood] will go into the 2010 conference.” Both Zaluar and Sawczak said more progress might be made in curbing nuclear weapons proliferation if the new U.S. administration can persuade a Democratic-led Senate to approve the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. “The fact of the matter is CTBT has a very direct and practical role in preventing new nuclear weapons states,” Sawczak said. “If you haven’t got as sophisticated a technological base as the U.S. has, you’ll have to expose yourself to a test at some stage.” To encourage international acceptance of any U.S.-proposed measures to tighten NPT mandates at the 2010 conference, “there’s a certain logic in doing CTBT first,” said the Australian diplomat.
North Korea today denied that it had agreed to a nuclear verification protocol that included collection of samples from its atomic facilities, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Nov. 11). Verification of Pyongyang’s atomic activities and holdings would be the next step in the program to dismantle the nation’s nuclear program. The United States said last month that North Korea had accepted a protocol that would include sampling and inspections of declared and possibly undeclared nuclear sites. The North Korean Foreign Ministry rejected the sampling component today. "Insisting on the so-called international standards and trying to demand more than what has been agreed upon between the D.P.R.K. (North Korea) will be considered as a house search and breach of sovereignty," the agency said in a statement. Verification activities would be allowed only at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and would consist solely of site inspections, document confirmation and discussions with technical employees, the Foreign Ministry said. The work can begin once North Korea has received the 1 million tons of fuel oil or related aid promised by the other nations participating in the six-party talks, according to Pyongyang. The Stalinist state confirmed reports that it had slowed the pace of disablement of key nuclear facilities due to discontent over the rewards it has received to date from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. Disablement, the second phase of the denuclearization process, is intended to prevent North Korea’s plutonium-producing nuclear reactor and other plants from resuming operations for at least one year. "In case the economic compensation continues to be delayed, the tempo of the disablement will be decreased accordingly, making it hard to predict the prospect of the six-party talks," the statement said (Agence France-Presse/Spacewar.com, Nov. 12). Pyongyang rejected any assertion that it is to blame for delays in the denuclearization process, Kyodo News reported. The statement came several months after Pyongyang temporarily suspended and then reversed disablement activities. “There are forces floating misinformation that the D.P.R.K. is to blame for this. They assert the need for the talks to adopt a verification document to which the collection of samples, etc. is added, claiming that the D.P.R.K.-U.S. Pyongyang agreement on the verification issue is insufficient,” according to the Foreign Ministry statement. “A written agreement was thus reached on the verification measures to be taken on the premise that the Oct. 3 agreement (between North Korea the United States) will be fully implemented to ensure the accuracy of the nuclear declaration,” it added (Kyodo News/Breitbart.com, Nov. 12).
Uranium traces found at an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor site might have been deposited by depleted uranium munitions used by Israel to destroy the facility last year, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem suggested today (see GSN, Nov. 11). Israel bombed the site in September 2007, and U.S. intelligence services later offered evidence that the facility was a nearly operational reactor designed with North Korean assistance to manufacture plutonium for nuclear weapons (see GSN, April 25). Syria permitted inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the site in June; laboratory analyses of soil and air samples indicated traces of processed uranium, Reuters reported this week, citing unnamed diplomats. Syria has denied having any covert nuclear activities, but has raised some suspicions by quickly razing the bombed site and erecting a new structure. It has also rejected IAEA requests to revisit the site and to examine additional locations. “The objective of this campaign of anonymous leaks is to find something to pressure Syria with. This is being turned into a political issue," Moualem said today in Damascus. “The U.S. complaint submitted to the IAEA seven months after the Israeli raid says that the facility was a reactor under construction, not operational. The question therefore is where did uranium particles come from?” Moualem said. “Didn't anyone ask what did the Israeli bombs contain? Didn't anyone pay attention that the United States and Israel have precedents in using ... uranium when bombing, whether in Iraq, south Lebanon or Afghanistan?” (Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Reuters, Nov. 12). One military expert said he doubted that Israel used depleted uranium munitions. “I would be skeptical of such a claim,” said John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org. Depleted uranium ammunition is primarily intended to penetrate armor plating, such as that found on tanks, Pike said, adding that he was unaware of any U.S. aircraft munitions that use the material. Therefore, it was unlikely that Israel had any such weapons. “The only munitions Israelis drop are ones we’ve sold them,” he said (Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Nov. 12). Meanwhile, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei yesterday urged “Syria to give us maximum transparency.” He also requested help from other nations. “I also continue to call on all these countries who have any information including satellite imageries to share it with the agency,” he said, criticizing the Israeli bombing. “The fact that we were not allowed to investigate that issue before the facility was destroyed” has made efforts “much more complicated for us,” ElBaradei said (Karel Janicek, Associated Press/Google News, Nov. 11).
International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei yesterday said that U.S. President-elect Barack Obama’s declared willingness to hold direct talks with Iran might encourage the Middle Eastern state to cooperate with a U.N. investigation of its nuclear activities, Reuters reported (see GSN, Nov. 11). Iran has refused to provide key information that would help the agency investigate international suspicions that its ostensibly civilian nuclear program might be geared toward weapons development. "If there is a direct dialogue between the United States and Iran, I think Iran will be more forthcoming with the agency," ElBaradei said. "(A) political opening will also convince Iran to work with us to solve remaining technical issues,” he added. “That political component of the (Iran) issue requires in my view a direct dialogue with Iran and that's why I am very encouraged by President-elect Obama's statement that he is ready to engage Iran in a direct dialogue without preconditions. … I have a lot of hope if that is a new policy.” "Right now we have a stalemate in the Iranian situation. … We are able to verify all their declared activities, we are able to verify their enrichment program, which is a good thing,” ElBaradei said. “But we are still not able to move forward on clarifying some of the outstanding issues related to alleged studies that could have some linkage to a possible military dimension." "There is a lot of concern about Iran, not today but about Iran in future ... whether once they develop the technology, what are they going to use it for, whether they will go for nuclear weapons. … That is the concern shared by the [U.N.] Security Council," ElBaradei said (Mlcochova/Dokoupil, Reuters, Nov. 11). U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns has traveled to Moscow to discuss the Iranian nuclear dispute with senior Russian officials, the Associated Press reported yesterday. Burns is expected to discuss Iran tomorrow with other envoys for the five permanent Security Council member states and Germany. The six nations have offered Iran political and economic incentives intended to persuade it to halt uranium enrichment, an effort that can produce nuclear power plant fuel but also a key nuclear bomb ingredient. Tomorrow’s talks are expected to address "where we are on the incentives side and what the prospects are for any movement by the Iranians," one State Department official said. To date, Washington has failed to persuade Beijing or Moscow to support a fourth Security Council sanctions resolution targeting Iran for its controversial nuclear activities. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana last week called on the six world powers to hold new discussions with Iran on its nuclear program, the State Department official said, adding that such talks would face especially difficult obstacles before Obama takes office in January. President George W. Bush yesterday extended a "national emergency" pertaining to Iran for one year, approving an order referring to the country’s "unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States" (Matthew Lee, Associated Press I/Google News, Nov. 11). As president, Obama would decide how aggressively to pursue new economic penalties against Iran, whether to offer the nation new benefits for nuclear cooperation, and whether to eliminate military action as an option for dealing with its nuclear sites, according to AP. Iran now possesses much of the equipment and knowledge needed to build nuclear weapons, and it would only need to enrich a enough uranium to fuel a bomb, said Anthony Cordesman, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "The worst case for a nuclear device is 2009, but it could well be 2011 to 2015 before Iran gets there," Cordesman told AP yesterday. "The critical issue is when Iran could have an effective nuclear-armed missile force. That could easily take two to three years longer." An Iranian nuclear-weapon development effort could be 80 percent complete, said David Kay, a former U.N. weapons inspector who led the Iraq Survey Group, the U.S.-led effort to search Iraq for weapons of mass destruction following the 2003 invasion. Kay said the final phases of building a nuclear weapon are the hardest, and noted that Iran’s nuclear program is 20 years old and has not yet developed a bomb. The country could be between two and five years from such a milestone, he said (Barry Schweid, Associated Press II/Google News, Nov. 12). Meanwhile, Turkey has expressed interest in mediating in the nuclear dispute during Obama’s presidential term, the New York Times reported yesterday. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that a letter sent to Obama last week by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was “a step that has to be made use of.” "We are ready to be the mediator," Erdogan told the newspaper. "I do believe we could be very useful." "We watch the relations between Iran and U.S. with great concern," he added. "We expect such issues to be resolved at the table. Wars are never solutions in this age" (Sabrina Tavernise, New York Times, Nov. 12). The head of Iran’s air force yesterday said his country has developed powerful measures to defend its airspace, the Xinhua News Agency reported. "The air force has built up a solid barrier against any kind of strike, using up-to-date equipment as well as unique military tactics," Iranian state media quoted Brig. Gen. Ahmad Miqani as saying. Miqani added that Iran’s military would remain alert to protect the country from possible strikes (Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 12).
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